The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor has long been seen as more than a bilateral partnership. It represents a regional shift in trade connectivity, energy logistics, and geopolitical influence. As CPEC expands under its second phase in 2025, reactions from neighboring countries India, Iran, and the Central Asian states highlight both its promise and its polarizing impact. While Pakistan and China frame CPEC as a driver of economic integration, others view it through the lens of competition, sovereignty, and strategic balance. The corridor’s reach from Kashgar to Gwadar positions it at the crossroads of some of Asia’s most contested economic and political interests.
India’s Opposition and Strategic Concerns
India remains the most vocal critic of CPEC, primarily due to its route passing through Gilgit-Baltistan, a territory claimed by both India and Pakistan. New Delhi argues that the project violates its sovereignty, while Beijing and Islamabad maintain that it serves regional development goals. India’s stance has hardened as CPEC continues to expand beyond infrastructure to energy, industry, and digital connectivity. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs reiterated in early 2025 that “CPEC undermines the principles of territorial integrity,” reflecting a consistent policy line since the project’s inception.
Beyond sovereignty concerns, India views CPEC as a strategic component of China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative that enhances Beijing’s influence in the Indian Ocean. The development of Gwadar Port, located less than 400 kilometers from India’s western coastline, is perceived as part of China’s “string of pearls” strategy a network of ports designed to secure trade and military access routes. Analysts from Al Jazeera note that India’s response has been twofold: building alternative trade routes and strengthening partnerships with the United States and Japan through the Indo-Pacific framework.
India’s investment in Iran’s Chabahar Port, often portrayed as a counterbalance to Gwadar, has gained new momentum. New Delhi and Tehran have renewed agreements to expand Chabahar’s capacity and connect it with the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links India to Central Asia and Europe via Iran and Russia. However, delays caused by sanctions and logistical hurdles have slowed progress, allowing CPEC to maintain its lead as the region’s most active connectivity initiative.
Iran’s Pragmatic Cooperation and Balancing Act
Unlike India, Iran’s approach to CPEC has been cautious but pragmatic. Tehran recognizes the potential benefits of regional integration while seeking to maintain its economic sovereignty. Iran’s recent entry into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and growing cooperation with China have opened new channels for dialogue on infrastructure and energy partnerships that could align with CPEC.
In early 2025, Iran and China began discussions on linking the Chabahar and Gwadar ports through a coastal trade corridor that would enhance logistics and minimize duplication. Reports from SCMP suggest that Tehran views this linkage as a way to complement, rather than compete with, CPEC. The collaboration would allow Iran to export oil and petrochemical products more efficiently, while Pakistan could gain access to Iranian markets and energy resources.
However, geopolitical realities continue to complicate Iran’s participation. Western sanctions restrict large-scale Chinese investment in Iranian infrastructure, and Tehran’s close ties with Russia have sometimes created overlapping priorities in regional transport planning. Despite these challenges, Iran’s alignment with China’s long-term Belt and Road vision suggests a gradual convergence rather than confrontation.
Central Asia’s Calculated Engagement
The Central Asian republics Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, view CPEC with cautious optimism. For these landlocked nations, the corridor offers potential access to sea routes through Gwadar, reducing their dependence on Russian and Iranian ports. In recent years, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have intensified engagement with Pakistan to explore transport agreements and energy trade.
According to Eurasia Review, Pakistan’s new rail connectivity initiative linking Karachi, Gwadar, and Kashgar could eventually extend northward into Central Asia. This would integrate the region into China’s transcontinental logistics chain, connecting Belt and Road projects in Central Asia with maritime trade through Pakistan. Such cooperation could reshape trade patterns across Eurasia, particularly as global supply chains seek alternatives to traditional routes passing through conflict-prone zones.
However, Central Asian states also remain wary of overdependence on China. Many of these countries are already heavily indebted to Beijing due to previous infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. As a result, their participation in CPEC-related ventures is likely to remain measured, emphasizing joint financing, diversification, and regional partnerships. The balance between economic opportunity and strategic autonomy continues to define their engagement.
Regional Diplomacy and the Future of Connectivity
CPEC’s expansion has compelled regional actors to rethink their connectivity strategies. India’s focus on the Chabahar route, Iran’s pivot toward China, and Central Asia’s growing interest in diversified access collectively demonstrate that the competition for regional trade corridors is intensifying. For Pakistan, this competition presents both challenges and opportunities. By positioning itself as a neutral hub for commerce rather than a geopolitical pawn, Islamabad aims to attract cooperation from multiple directions.
Diplomatically, China has been working to lower tensions around CPEC by emphasizing its developmental nature. Beijing has repeatedly invited India to join dialogue mechanisms under the Belt and Road framework, though New Delhi remains unwilling. Meanwhile, Pakistan has advocated for linking CPEC with other regional initiatives such as the ECO Trade Corridor and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program, promoting the concept of an integrated “corridor of corridors.”
CPEC’s success will depend on how effectively it can adapt to regional complexities. Inclusive cooperation that accommodates diverse interests could transform South and Central Asia into a web of interconnected economies rather than competing spheres of influence.
Conclusion
CPEC’s regional context reveals a complex mosaic of rivalry, pragmatism, and gradual convergence. For India, the project remains a sovereignty issue tied to its security calculus. For Iran, it represents a potential avenue for trade and diplomatic leverage. For Central Asia, it is a pragmatic opportunity to connect with global markets. Each response reflects not only national priorities but also shifting geopolitical realities in a multipolar Asia.
As CPEC expands beyond borders, its long-term stability will depend on whether regional stakeholders choose cooperation over competition. If successfully managed, it could redefine the geography of trade and diplomacy across the region, turning economic corridors into genuine bridges of regional integration.
